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1. Introduction 
Conventional wisdom holds that building democracy takes time. Deliberative democracy will 
likely prove no exception. To that end, this chapter will explore one possible path towards more 
deliberative institutions and decision-making in the form of Gastil and Wright’s proposal for a 
Sortition Chamber. Our thesis is that deliberative innovations, notably a sortition chamber, require 
a gradualist approach to implementation. While other authors in this volume may take for granted 
that some form of sortition chamber will be institutionalized and focus instead on design questions, 
we probe the necessary conditions preceding institutionalization. To support this thesis, we shall 
make an argument comprising four main claims.  
1.) Sortition is a promising deliberative innovation. 
2.) A strong, unaccountable deliberative device like sortition may delegitimize citizen 
deliberation and future deliberative innovations, in particular a sortition chamber.  
3.) A weaker deliberative device like citizens’ consultation is effective though often blocked 
by a lack of institutional footing. 
4.) Citizens’ consultation, once proven to be effective and regular, opens one path towards 
enhanced deliberative innovations like the sortition chamber.  
Claim 1.) will not be developed here beyond the point that a sortition chamber’s “hybrid 
legitimacy” may allow it to overcome critiques addressed to one-shot, single-issue consultative or 
2 
 
empowered mini-publics which may lack institutional footing1. Such mini-publics face multiple 
challenges: significant social or political uptake, electoral accountability, capture by interests, 
political redundancy, representativeness, biases, frames2. If a sortition chamber prima facie meets 
or precludes these different critiques, it represents a striking contribution to democratic innovations 
beyond mini-publics. 
That said, we must work out claims 2.), 3.) and 4.) in individual sections below. While examples 
in 3.) and 4.) will mainly be drawn from the European Union, we maintain that this argument is 
broadly applicable at local, regional national and transnational levels. We argue that, if 
institutionalizing consultative mini-publics is desirable and feasible at the EU level, it will be all 
the more so at other levels throughout the decision-making process’ different stages.   
 
2. Dangers of delegitimization 
There are both principled and pragmatic reasons for advocating a gradualist approach. Introducing 
a sortition chamber without considerable public trust and institutional redesign is likely to 
undermine sortition’s wider operationalization and to delegitimize citizen deliberation and further 
deliberative innovations. In general, citizens and decision-makers are ill-prepared to implement a 
sortition chamber outright. 
To understand why, we must consider the institutional mechanisms for implementation. Most 
likely, institutional redesign would be decided through two channels: either public referendum or 
                                                             
1 We owe the expression “hybrid legitimacy” to Julien Talpin, “How Can Constitutional Reforms Be Deliberative? 
The Hybrid Legitimacies of Constitutional Deliberative Democracy” in Min Reuchamps and Jane Suiter (eds.), 
Constitutional Deliberative Democracy in Europe (Colchester, UK: ECPR, 2016), pp. 93-108. Whereas Talpin’s 
hybrid concerns whether epistemic, common-sense, democratic and representative legitimacy can accrue in one 
constitutional setting, we only mean that the sortition chamber’s blend of empowerment, continuity and embeddedness 
could secure several forms of legitimacy which other kinds of mini-publics lack by dint of design.  
2 For a synthetic account exploring these challenges, see John Parkinson, Deliberating in the Real World: Problems 
of Legitimacy in Deliberative Democracy (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2006).   
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legislation by institutional decision-makers. From the electoral reform, democratization and 
institutionalist literature, we take up three problems compounding a sortition chamber’s 
implementation through these two channels: a.) resistance from citizens, b.) resistance from 
decision-makers, and c.) lack of empirical evidence on sortition chambers or continuous 
empowered embedded mini-publics. 
 
a. Resistance from citizens 
 
Citizen ignorance and status quo bias 
As a sortition chamber reduces or limits the scope of legislative institutions, elected or otherwise, 
it represents a significant electoral reform of which different veto-players would need to be 
convinced. Indeed, the point should be made stronger: systemic change of this scope amplifies 
ordinary obstacles to electoral reform, and we lack cases suitable for direct comparison3. 
Regarding citizens and voters, one widespread view holds that, if the former have no structured 
preferences on an issue, risk-aversion leads them to preserve the status quo4. Status quo bias may 
be compounded when the vote bears on issues or institutions embedded in constitutions for which 
change requires a qualified majority. 
While status quo bias does not tell the whole story of why voters vote as they do, it remains part 
of the explanatory toolkit. Writing on referendums, Alan Renwick contrasts the above view, the 
“anxiety-based voting model”, with “issue-based” and “cue-based” voting models, which suppose 
                                                             
3 One imperfect comparison might be universal suffrage. 
4 For a succinct version, Matthew Mendelsohn and Andrew Parkin, “Introduction: Referendum Democracy” in 
Matthew Mendelsohn and Andrew Parkin (eds.), Referendum Democracy: Citizens, Elites and Deliberation in 
Referendum Campaigns (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave), pp. 1–22.  
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a well-informed voter or one reliant on heuristic shortcuts5. Although all three models are generally 
present in voter behavior, “the prevalence of each of these forms of voting varies, most notably, in 
response to the saliency of the issue in the referendum question”6. Moreover, these forms rely on 
information the quality of which may vary depending on cue-givers, misinformation campaigns, 
media coverage, and campaign spending7. To this should be added Renwick’s cautious assertion 
that “opinion during referendum campaigns tends to shift towards the status quo” and away from 
change8. The safest conclusion is that a sortition chamber is unlikely to emerge from a referendum 
when less ambitious changes, e.g. legislative term-limits, campaign funding and voting reform, 
citizens’ consultation, could accomplish similar objectives with higher chances of success.  
 
Sortition and complex concepts 
If the sortition chamber adequately meets criteria for democratic justification, it is because the 
chamber incorporates several complex tools and concepts: stratified random sampling, equal 
opportunity for selection, open agenda, cognitive diversity, deliberative public input, and 
legitimacy without electoral accountability. While it broadly shares these with other deliberative 
innovations, e.g. mini-publics, it puts certain to new, more sophisticated uses (wherefore its 
“hybrid legitimacy”). On one hand, equal opportunity for selection and strict term limits would 
lead to more independent and public-minded legislators. On the other, agenda-setting and decision-
making power may stand free of voter authorization and electoral accountability. Accordingly, if 
we understand accountability as “being held to account by external actors”, legitimacy obtains 
                                                             
5 Alan Renwick, “Referendums” in Kai Arzheimer, Jocelyn Evans and Michael S. Lewis-Beck (eds.), The SAGE 
Handbook of Electoral Behaviour, Volume 1 (London, UK: SAGE Publications, 2017), pp. 433-458, especially 444-
45. 
6 Ibid., p. 445.  
7 Ibid., pp. 445-8. 
8 Alan Renwick, “Referendums”, p. 450. For the datasets and broader argument, see pp. 448-53. 
5 
 
independently of such accountability9.  
It is an open question whether voters (or decision-makers for that matter) would accept this battery 
of complex concepts when deciding whether to implement a sortition chamber. Certainly, the ideas 
informing certain concepts seem appealing in the current climate of political disillusionment and 
institutional dysfunction, but the concepts themselves and the uses to which they are put remain 
unfamiliar, even unsettling. All the more so when it is a question not of implementing groups with 
limited service-time or decision-making power but of fundamentally altering the lawmaking 
process. In short, citizens (or decision-makers) may be unsure whether a sortition chamber merits 
their support and whether they would later recognize the chamber as a legitimate source of laws10.  
 
b. Resistance from decision-makers 
We have asserted that citizens and voters are unlikely to support a sortition chamber if less 
ambitious reforms are possible and the concepts underpinning sortition remain unfamiliar. These 
difficulties seem even more pronounced with decision-makers within public institutions. Clearly, 
implementing a sortition chamber would, referendum or no, require decision-makers’ agreement 
as altering legislative institutions would often involve altering a constitution, for which a qualified 
majority is necessary. Faced with entrenched constitutions and uncertain public opinion, decision-
                                                             
9 This leaves open two possibilities. First, a sortition chamber might enjoy other kinds of accountability in the form 
of “giving account internally or externally” or “being held to account by internal actors”, e.g. formal or informal 
sanctions or censure. Second, it may be that conventional thinking on accountability simply does not apply to the 
sortition device. For an argument in this direction, see Campbell Wallace in this volume. 
10 For an initial examination of this question, see Pierre-Etienne Vandamme, Vincent Jacquet, Christoph Niessen, 
John Pitseys and Min Reuchamps in this volume. They find that citizens are more open or, at least, more neutral to 
the idea of a sortition or mixed chamber whereas decision-makers are strongly opposed. On citizen familiarity, see 
also Ned Crosby in this volume. Concerning the referendum on electoral reform formulated by the Ontario Citizens’ 
Assembly, opinion polls collecting voters’ reasons for supporting or opposing the reform suggest that they held neutral 
opinions on a sortition-selected body’s being the source of the proposal. See Lawrence Leduc, “How and Why Electoral 
Reform Fails: Evaluating the Canadian Experience”, paper presented at ECPR Joint Sessions Workshops, Lisbon, 
2009. 
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makers may resist change absent several conditions: political will and self-interest, social learning 
and ideational change. 
 
Political will and self-interest 
A standard story of rules emerges from the literature: rules are stable because of institutional 
rigidity, procedural hurdles (e.g. qualified majorities), and decision-makers’ strategic motivations. 
Hence, instances of electoral reform seldom occur. Yet this may not be the whole story as reform 
attempts are in fact quite common, particularly at sub-national or local levels11. Regardless, 
successful major reforms remain rare overall12.  
We draw attention to two ways of making sense of this rarity. First, from a rational choice 
perspective, whether decision-makers support an electoral reform follows from the parties’ 
reflection on their own self-interest. Incumbents’ self-interest determines whether they resist 
reforms or pursue strategic rule changes13. If self-interest alone is insufficient to undertake and 
implement reform and may require external pressure, e.g. social movements, voter initiative, 
judicial intervention, it remains necessary for reforms14. When popular support is the primary 
driver, decision-makers must sign on for reforms and may even co-opt them to further their self-
interest. Indeed, major electoral reforms most often take the form of “elite majority imposition” or 
“elite-mass interaction” wherein decision-makers either retain control of the reform process and 
                                                             
11 See Shaun Bowler and Todd Donovan, The Limits of Electoral Reform (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2013, 
pp. 6-8). 
12 A conclusion shared by Alan Renwick, The Politics of Electoral Reform: Changing the Rules of Democracy 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010, p. 10). 
13 Bowler and Donovan, The Limits of Electoral Reform, pp. 19-23. For a more general overview of rational choice 
theory as applied to institutions, see Peter A. Hall and Rosemary C.R. Taylor, “Political Science and the Three New 
Institutionalisms”, Political Studies XLIV (1996): 936-957, especially pp. 942-946. Finally, see also Bouricius and 
Vandamme et al. in this volume for parallel considerations. 
14 Bowler and Donovan, The Limits of Electoral Reform, pp. 23-25. On the relation between social movements and 
sortition, see Donatella Della Porta and Andrea Felicetti in this volume.  
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pursue strictly strategic goals or lose control of the reform process to the public but retain an 
essential role in defining its final form15.  
In short, the road to reform goes through decision-makers. To receive decision-makers’ backing, 
sortition chamber proponents must show how sortition dovetails with self-interest. Wherefore one 
immediate obstacle: convincing decision-makers that eliminating or limiting their role in the 
decision-making process is conducive to their interests. Though inimical to decision-makers’ 
short-term interests, a sortition chamber might appeal to their long-term interests if conditions such 
as “systemic threat” or “idealism” obtain16. Decision-makers may be motivated to avoid future 
electoral instability, reestablish their own legitimacy, make electoral changes better to meet 
democratic ideals or unload no-win decisions onto another party. However, background stability, 
normal politics and uncertainty over the fall-out from sortition may leave decision-makers 
unmoved17. We again suggest that less ambitious approaches may face lesser obstacles all while 
reaching similar goals. In contrast, pursuing more ambitious reforms could set back the underlying 
goal of making lawmaking more deliberative by provoking voter backlash or stonewalling from 
decision-makers. 
 
Social learning and ideational change 
The second way is cultural: whether decision-makers support an electoral reform follows from 
“cultural” conditions such as social learning, ideational change or diffusion, regional contagion, 
and electoral fashion. In a word, whether decision-makers back reform partially depends on 
whether innovations are “culturally” available to them such that they converge on a specific 
                                                             
15 Renwick, The Politics of Electoral Reform, pp. 11-16. 
16 Ibid., pp. 12-13.  
17 Ibid, pp. 50-52. Renwick later emphasizes that exogenous factors also constrain outcomes, e.g. cognitive constraints 
and limited information (pp. 239-242). See also Crosby in this volume. 
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reform, e.g. sortition chamber, “through voluntary emulation or borrowing from other political 
systems, through interaction, through external actors imposing innovation, and through the 
entrepreneurship of expert networks”18. These may help isolate the drivers behind changes in 
information, objectives and values relevant to electoral reform as well as the processes and 
institutions framing them. 
We shall only sketch how this impacts a sortition chamber’s chances with decision-makers. When 
deciding whether to initiate or back a reform, decision-makers may look to what reforms 
organizations, states and policy actors are undertaking. If decision-makers are more likely to 
consider and adopt reforms being considered or implemented by other actors but a sortition 
chamber does not yet figure among those reforms (unlike other deliberative innovations), it is 
unlikely that decision-makers will consider the sortition chamber a viable reform path. For they 
cannot arrive at sortition either through borrowing from another political system or through 
developing the idea in interaction with other systems. Similarly, there are at present no significant 
actors, internal or external, imposing such changes on decision-makers, nor sufficiently prominent 
and cohesive sortition expert networks acting as middleman between sortition reform 
entrepreneurs and decision-makers19. All in all, barring such diffusion, a sortition chamber will 
meet with resistance from decision-makers in that “cognitive constraints” diminish its 
appropriateness as a legislative and electoral alternative20.  
                                                             
18 Anthony R. Zito and Adriaan Schout “Learning theory reconsidered: EU integration theories and learning”, Journal 
of European Public Policy 16:8 (2009), 1103-1123, p. 1108. 
19 For the importance of a well-designed, largely agreed upon sortition design to reform, see Crosby in this volume. 
Indeed, the diversity of approaches in this volume, e.g. bicameral, unicameral, multi-body, pure sortition, mixed 
sortition, one-shot, continuous, aggregative, deliberative, participatory, radical, is suggestive of the difficulties in 
forming a cohesive sortition expert network. 
20 For discussion of cognitive constraints, ideational change and diffusion, see also Renwick, The Politics of Electoral 
Reform, pp. 47-68, especially 59-60. We leave open whether this cultural approach to institutional reform owes more 
to historical or sociological approaches to institutions. See Hall and Taylor, “Political Science and the Three New 
Institutionalisms”, pp. 937-942, 946-950. 
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c. Lack of empirical evidence on sortition chambers 
The final difficulty concerns citizens and decision-makers alike: a lack of empirical evidence on 
the degree to which sortition succeeds as a democratic innovation. Though straightforward to 
imagine a sortition chamber overcoming institutional challenges and individual failings, it is also 
possible to imagine it falling short on those counts. In a word, until more evidence is available on 
a sortition chamber or a body sufficiently like it, i.e. a continuous empowered embedded mini-
public, we cannot rule out different outcomes in terms of intrabody accountability, interbody 
accountability, citizen professionalization, and citizen visibility.  
 
Intrabody accountability 
Intrabody accountability designates the possibility of a sortition chamber member’s being held to 
account by the chamber, whether as informal sanctions by members or formal sanctions by the 
oversight committee. Although this possibility may follow simply from the fact of face-to-face 
interaction and could constrain discourse and deliberation in important ways, it is unclear how well 
this truly functions as an accountability mechanism. While a member’s being held to account for 
her remarks and reasons depends on members’ willingness to hold her to account, her being held 
to account for her individual votes would instead hinge on her voting record being made public 
within the chamber, which the authors preclude by use of secret ballot. In a word, more evidence 
is needed on how participants in such bodies behave towards one another before we consider 
intrabody accountability secure.  
 
Interbody accountability 
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Interbody accountability concerns a sortition chamber’s being held to account by its counterpart 
legislative body. Insofar as direct relations exist between the counterpart and the sortition chamber 
(e.g. reconciliation process, joint hearings, intra-legislative checks and balances), the counterpart 
may formally or informally demand reasons for the chamber’s outcomes. Moreover, it may 
exercise an important check on the chamber’s legislative output if its joint approval is required for 
a bill’s passage21.  
Notably, this might also allow for transitive authorization and accountability through the 
democratically elected counterpart’s direct authorization from and being held to account by the 
public such that the public exercises some indirect control over the sortition assembly through the 
counterpart. If accountability may be transitive, the sortition chamber will only be transitively 
accountable on the condition that the democratically elected counterpart is itself accountable, i.e. 
both gives account to the public and is held to account by the public. For some bodies, one may 
reasonably conclude that this is not the case, given falling turn-out (as in the European Parliament), 
high incumbency rates (as in the United States Congress), etc. Regardless, whether the counterpart 
would fruitfully exercise such accountability on its own behalf or that of the public remains an 
open question for which greater work on the relation between sortition chambers and their 
legislative counterparts is required. 
 
Citizen professionalization 
A significant level of professionalization and institutional know-how is required from chamber’s 
members if they are to work effectively with actors in the decision-making system. Such 
professionalization and know-how might well increase assembly members’ influence and avoid 
                                                             
21 For worries that it would not, see Bouricius and Vandamme et al. in this volume. 
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partisan contagion but could, by the same token, make members another set of out-of-touch 
professional politicians22. For the European Parliament example, an EU-level sortition chamber 
would need to learn the ins and outs of a decision-making process largely opaque to most citizens 
given a lack of EU civic education. EU sortition chamber members could well become part of or 
be perceived as the “Brussels bubble”. To decide the question one way or another, evidence drawn 
from participant behavior in continuous empowered embedded mini-publics is vital.  
 
Citizen visibility 
To what degree would sortition chamber members’ deliberation benefit from social uptake and 
play a role in public will-formation? Certainly, chamber may be guaranteed visibility through its 
share of the decision-making power and institutional linkage with well-known decision-makers. 
Similarly, the chamber’s novelty may lead to increased attention from traditional and new media. 
On the other hand, visibility comes in degrees, and it is equally conceivable that members enjoy 
either too much or too little visibility. The former could expose lay citizens serving in the chamber 
to uncharitable treatment or confrontation with politicians or experts in the media, which may 
prove detrimental to members’ performance. Conversely, the chamber may lack the strong 
personalities vital for generating social uptake as members are selected on the basis of neither 
personality nor rhetorical capacity, unlike their elected counterparts. Likewise, opaque institutional 
arrangements may hide what the chamber in fact does. In both cases, the media might choose to 
focus on members themselves or the institution’s novelty rather than on disseminating arguments, 
reasons and conclusions from deliberation. Visibility can come at the cost of dissemination23. 
                                                             
22 For concerns over professionalization and partisan contagion, see Tom Malleson, David Schecter, Bouricius, 
Crosby, and Vandamme et al. in this volume. 
23 Parkinson, Deliberating in the Real World, pp. 99-123. For broader questions of the sortition chamber’s participatory 
shortcomings, see Yves Sintomer, Della Porta and Felicetti, and Malleson in this volume.  
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Taking the example of EU, one proposal to increase visibility of European Parliament members 
consists in democratic contestation and politicizing the EU agenda24. Yet, directly, an EU-level 
sortition chamber could not increase contestation and politicization in its own body, nor is it 
obvious that it would indirectly help its counterpart, the Parliament, to emphasize partisan lines 
and amplify interests. All in all, important empirical answer are needed before we can state with 
any certainty whether the public and media spheres would take up the sortition chamber’s 
deliberation and whether such dissemination is net-positive for members and public. 
Given the chamber’s “black box” status, it is more reasonable to advocate as an initial step in 
deliberative innovations the institutionalization of consultative mini-publics at the national or 
transnational level. Should these mini-publics prove successful, there will likely emerge greater 
public and political will for further deliberative innovations, such as sortition chambers. 
 
3. Effective consultation 
In this section, we lay out the reasons why continuous embedded consultative mini-publics further 
citizen deliberation and how they can avoid the problems plaguing earlier consultative 
experiments. We begin by examining reasons for preferring such mini-publics before taking up 
the example of a project which we have recently submitted at the EU-level to institutionalize 
consultative mini-publics and then set out a design proposal for combining existing consultation 
procedures with decentralized mini-publics as effective tools for deliberation-making, legitimacy-
seeking and capacity-building when properly integrated in the deliberative system25. 
 
                                                             
24 Andreas Follesdal and Simon Hix, “Why There is a Democratic Deficit in the EU: A Response to Majone and 
Moravcsik”, Journal of Common Market Studies 44:3 (2006): 533-562.  
25 Nicole Curato and Marit Böker. 2016. “Linking Mini-Publics to the Deliberative System: A Research Agenda.” 
Policy Sciences 49(2): 173–90. 
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a. Reasons for preferring consultative mini-publics 
An important part of showing that there is good reason to promote continuous embedded 
consultative mini-publics consists in removing relevant reasons to doubt their efficacy or 
institutionalization. Two main reasons come to mind which we take up in turn: 1.) empowered 
mini-publics are preferable to consultative mini-publics; 2.) consultative mini-publics consistently 
fail in social uptake due to poor or critical media coverage. 
 
Empowered mini-publics 
If empowered mini-publics are more efficacious in terms of results, less frustrating for participants 
and better prepare citizens to support a sortition chamber, what reason do we then have for favoring 
a consultative mini-public? Before pursuing this question, it is important to note that mini-publics 
can be empowered in several ways: they may have decision-making or agenda-setting power. 
Naturally, showing why a mini-public should or should not have one of these powers appeals to 
starkly different considerations. 
Regarding decision-making power, we begin by noting that, to date, no mini-public has been given 
ultimate decision-making power as it lacks familiar forms of public accountability, in the sense of 
being held to account by the public on whose behalf it would decide. Some mini-publics have 
experimented with intermediate forms of decision-making power, as with the citizens’ assemblies 
on electoral reform in British Columbia and Ontario and those on constitutional reform in Ireland, 
Iceland and Luxembourg26. The Canadian citizens’ assemblies were granted the power to choose 
                                                             
26 On the assemblies in Ireland, Iceland and Luxembourg, see respectively: Jane Suiter, David M. Farrell and Clodagh 
Harris, “The Irish Constitutional Convention: A Case of ‘High Legitimacy’?” in Min Reuchamps and Jane Suiter (eds.), 
Constitutional Deliberative Democracy in Europe (Colchester, UK: ECPR, 2016), pp. 33-52; Eirikur Bergmann, 
“Participatory Constitutional Deliberation in the Wake of Crisis: The Case of Iceland” in Min Reuchamps and Jane 
Suiter (eds.), Constitutional Deliberative Democracy in Europe (Colchester, UK: ECPR, 2016), pp. 15-32; Raphael 
Kies, Les consultations citoyennes et les réformes constitutionnelles, report for the Chamber of Deputies, 
Luxembourg, 2015. 
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a new voting system which would then be put to public referendum. In part, this owed to 
organizers’ recognition that the Assembly group “did not have the requisite authority to speak 
exclusively for the people”27. After the British Columbia referenda failed to reach the necessary 
threshold and the Ontario referendum was rejected by a majority, no similar experiments in 
intermediate decision-making power were reproduced for electoral reforms or other issues.  
In the case of Ireland and Luxembourg, citizens were granted the power to elaborate proposals on 
pre-selected areas of constitutional reform which would then be discussed and voted upon by the 
parliament. In Iceland, constitutional reform was still more ambitious as it granted citizens the 
power to draft a new constitution combining electoral and participative procedures, subject to 
advisory referendum and parliamentary approval. While a majority of Iceland’s citizens backed 
the 2012 referendum on the draft constitution, the decision on the bill for a new constitution was 
ultimately delegated to the following parliament and remains in limbo. The constitutional process 
in Luxembourg finds itself in a similar position after rejection of the 2015 referendum’s three 
questions concerning specific constitutional reforms28.  
In contrast, Ireland’s government seems to have taken the Constitutional Convention seriously as 
they answered the latter’s initial reports in a timely fashion and two referenda took place in spring 
2015 on questions raised by the convention, of which one (marriage equality) passed. Of the 
examples cited here, it qualifies as the most successful experience at the level of output29. Yet the 
lessons from these experiments show that intermediate decision-making power alone is no 
guarantee of efficacy nor are organizers and decision-makers ready to entrust the mini-public with 
                                                             
27 Lawrence Leduc, Heather Bastedo and Catherine Baquero, “The Quiet Referendum: Why Electoral Referendum 
Failed in Ontario”, paper presented at Canadian Political Science Association annual meeting, Vancouver, 2008, p. 8. 
28 Patrick Dumont and Raphaël Kies, “Luxembourg”, European Journal of Political Research Political Data Yearbook 
55:1 (2016): 175–82. 
29 For more on the Irish Constitutional Convention, see Tom Arnold in this volume. 
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ultimate decision-making power. Further conditions must be met. Moreover, in none of these cases 
did the mini-public have the power to set the agenda. Instead, they were free to decide within a 
pre-defined set of parameters. Even intermediate decision-making power is deemed too much to 
pair with agenda-setting power.  
 
Social uptake 
Overall, social uptake was weak in the cases cited, not least in part due to poor or critical media 
coverage. In the British Columbia case, the public reported feeling uninformed on the subject30. 
Not only were they unsure of what they were voting for but many were surprised that a referendum 
was taking place to begin with. Though the referendum was nearly successful with 55% turnout, 
many voters relied on pre-conceived notions when deciding as they lacked the education which 
Assembly members had received. Likewise, in the Ontario case, “the Assembly’s 
recommendations were also not widely discussed nor well understood by the public at large”31.The 
Iceland case saw similar uptake problems due to the complexity of the process and to failures in 
organizing the elections to vote for members of the citizens’ constituent assembly32.  
All in all, this analysis of existing empowered mini-publics suggests that their implementation and 
institutionalization is complex due to political resistance, citizens’ skepticism, limited social 
uptake, poor or critical media coverage and organizational failures. The relative success of the 
Irish case, suggests that – in our historical phase of sortition ignorance – that mini-publics can only 
be effective:  
a.) if politicians are included in the process;  
                                                             
30 Archon Fung, “British Columbia Citizens' Assembly on Electoral Reform”, Participedia, 2009.  
31 Leduc et al., “The Quiet Referendum”, p. 1. 
32 Aleksi Eerola and Min Reuchamps, “Constitutional Modernisation and Deliberative Democracy: A Political Science 
Assessment of Four Cases”, Revue interdisciplinaire d’études juridiques 77:2 (2016): 18.  
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b.) if citizens have an intermediate decision-making power on a pre-defined agenda;  
c.) if the final decision rests with political representatives and/or sovereign citizens through 
referendum; 
d.) if mini-publics are organized regularly on a broader range of topics, other than constitutional 
or electoral reform. 
This last condition would institutionalize (or embed) mini-publics and help to overcome pitfalls 
which non-institutionalized (or dissociated) versions invariably face, in particular social and 
political uptake33. Put differently, no amount of empoweredness can overcome the lack of 
institutionalization. If these experiments remain sporadic affairs, we will unable to build the trust 
in mini-publics needed to introduce, with reasonable odds of success, a sortition chamber. In the 
next section, we take the EU as an example to show how institutionalizing citizens’ mini-publics 
is feasible and desirable even in such a complex multi-lingual setting.   
 
b. EU citizens’ consultation 
The example in question is a project which we have recently submitted at the EU level to 
institutionalize consultative mini-publics when the European Commission organizes public 
hearings on its initiatives. Over the past decade, the EU has organized several participative projects 
to expand citizens’ participation in policy-making from voting to engaging with EU-level 
institutions and holding them to account34. The projects have taken different forms: deliberative 
consultation (European Citizens’ Consultation), deliberative polling (Europolis) or petition 
                                                             
33 For an overview, see the discussion of insiders and outsiders, followers and challenges in Didier Caluwaerts and 
Min Reuchamps, “Generating Democratic Legitimacy through Deliberative Innovations: The Role of Embeddedness 
and Disruptiveness”, Representation 52:1 (2016): 13-27.  
34 Mundo Yang, “Europe’s New Communication Policy and the Introduction of Transnational Deliberative Citizens’ 
Involvement Projects” in Raphael Kies and Patrizia Nanz (eds.), Is Europe Listening to Us? Successes and Failures 
of EU Citizen Consultations (London: Routledge, 2013) pp. 17-34. 
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systems (European Citizens’ Initiative). They have taken place with different kinds of 
communication (virtual or face-to-face) at different geographical levels (national, cross-border or 
pan-European). 
In recent analysis of such experiments, most authors have concluded that, though valuable from a 
civic perspective, these experiments did not fulfil their democratic ambition of informing and 
empowering a significant number of lay citizens on complex EU issues35. In short, we see similar 
conclusions at the national level: they make for intriguing civic experiments but fail to generate 
lasting social and political impact. In a recent presentation taken up by the European Economic 
and Social Committee, we suggested that a valuable place to break this experimental deadlock 
without transforming EU institutional settings is to introduce mini-publics within the context of 
the European Commission’s public consultation website, previously known as “Your Voice in 
Europe36. Originally designed to allow stakeholders to contribute to Commission initiatives, it has 
since evolved to become a broadly used consultation tool for stakeholders and citizens37. This tool 
serves three purposes: 1.) allow the Commission to make use of external expertise and thus create 
better policies; 2.) ensure that EU actions are coherent and transparent; 3.) increase the EU’s 
democratic legitimacy by giving citizens’ greater voice in the decision-making process38.  
                                                             
35 Raphael Kies and Patrizia Nanz (eds.), Is Europe Listening to Us? Successes and Failures of EU Citizen 
Consultations (London: Routledge, 2013); Espen Olsen and Hans Jörg Trenz, “From Citizens’ Deliberation to Popular 
Will Formation? Generating Democratic Legitimacy in Transnational Deliberative Polling”, Political Studies 62:1 
(2014): 117–33. 
36 Raphael Kies, “The seven golden rules to promote EU citizens consultation”, paper presented at Fourth International 
Conference on Legislation and Law Reform, World Bank, Washington,  17-18 November 2016; Elisa Lironi  and 
Daniela Peta, “European Economic and Social Committee EU Public Consultations in the Digital Age: Enhancing the 
Role of the EESC and Civil Society Organizations”, Report for the European Economic and Social Committee, 2017.  
37 Christine Quittkatt, “The European Commission’s Online Consultations: A Success Story?”, Journal of Common 
Market Studies 49:3 (2011): 653–74; European Commission, “Better Regulation Guidelines”, Commission staff 
working document.(2016): 17. 
38 Christian Marxsen, “Open Stakeholder Consultations at the European Level – Voice of the Citizens?”, European 
Law Journal 21:2 (2015): 261.  
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Unlike other EU deliberative experiments, this consultation comes with minimal standards aiming 
to ensure that consultation is clear, inclusive, transparent, long enough (at least 12 weeks) and, 
more importantly, that the commission provides feedback. The feedback requirement imposes 
three duties: a.) acknowledging receipt of contributions and publishing them; b.) publishing and 
displaying consultation results; c.) giving adequate feedback on how results were taken into 
consideration in the policy-making process39.  
Yet the Commission struggles to provide feedback to individual contributions within a reasonable 
time. A May 2017 report shows that the Commission provided participants feedback in roughly 
65% of public consultations processed in 201640. This delay owes to the high number of 
consultations to process (around 100 per year) and the chronic lack of human resources facing the 
EU. Likewise, lay citizens are almost absent from the consultative process, implying that the 
process is essentially dominated by civil society organizations, public authorities and research 
centers41. Significant citizen participation occurred either in the form of petitions or consultations 
conducted as online surveys in an essentially multiple-choice format42. In other words, significant 
citizen participation most often proved superficial and with little social uptake. Although the 
reasons for this are well known, i.e. topic complexity, lack of interest in EU affairs, the procedure’s 
low visibility, there may be a way to reserve this trend.  
  
                                                             
39 European Commission, “Better Regulation Guidelines”, p. 84. 
40 Elisa Lironi  and Daniela Peta, “European Economic and Social Committee EU Public Consultations in the Digital 
Age”.  
41 Romain Badouard, “Combining inclusion with impact on the decision? The Commission’s online consultation on 
the European Citizens’ Initiative” in Raphael Kies and Patrizia Nanz (eds.), Is Europe Listening to Us? Successes and 
Failures of EU Citizen Consultations (London: Routledge, 2013) pp. 153-172. 
42 Christian Marxsen, “Open Stakeholder Consultations at the European Level”, p. 275. 
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c. Combining EU consultation with decentralized mini-publics 
We contend that the strong imbalance in favor of organized groups can be tackled by introducing 
decentralized mini-publics (in the different member states) deliberating on select Commission 
initiatives. If correctly designed and implemented, this process would enable diverse voices to be 
heard (through socio-demographic and geographical representativeness) when new EU initiatives 
are elaborated and would therefore contribute to meeting the three objectives of EU public 
consultations, largely shared with other institutions: better policy, coherence and transparency, 
democratic legitimacy.  
As we will argue in the last section, if such consultative practices are regularly repeated and 
adapted at the national level – for example, for select parliamentary and governmental initiatives 
– it would help familiarize citizens with mini-publics as an efficient consultative method and 
concepts which mini-publics share with a sortition chamber. Before returning to possible 
transitions towards a sortition chamber, we should first sketch how these mini-publics should be 
organized for efficient inclusion in the EU decision-making process and for increased information 
and participation among lay citizens. Specifically, we lay out initial proposals concerning: 1.) issue 
selection, 2.) citizen selection, 3.) mini-public set-up, and 4.) consultation outcomes.  
Regarding issue selection, since it would make little sense to foresee consultation on all possible 
topics, we suggest that consultation be organized on a selection of topics concerning major 
initiatives, e.g. initiatives involving high costs, new legislation, and/or a large number of citizens. 
Similar to participative procedures like the Oregon Citizens’ Review Initiative, a mixed 
commission – comprising political officials from the relevant decision-making bodies, organizers 
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and a sample of citizens – would select the topics to be discussed by the national mini-publics43. 
The example of the Irish Constitutional Convention – comprising one-third political 
representatives and two-thirds citizens – convincingly suggests that, against expectations, 
involving politicians in the consultative process is not only necessary to guarantee its success but 
also benefits participants and consultation outcomes44. 
Concerning citizen selection and mini-public set-up, we favor decentralized consultation involving 
a limited number of citizens, of which one good example is the European Citizens’ Consultations45. 
In each territorial unit, mini-publics of 30 to 60 participants would be selected on the basis of 
representative socio-demographic criteria. To rationalize organizational and budgetary costs, the 
national Commission representation could host these mini-publics in the EU case. In other cases, 
one could appeal to decision-makers, foundations or wealthy individuals for funding46.  
To prepare for deliberation, the mini-public would receive a briefing from both the initiative’s 
opponents and proponents both as well as neutral experts. Using these sources, their own values 
and third-party research, mini-public members would weigh the propositions’ pros and cons by 
means of facilitation techniques enabling all viewpoints to be heard and points of consensus to be 
uncovered. Depending on the topic discussed, the session could run from one to several full days. 
Once deliberations are concluded, different viewpoints (pro and con), questions and 
recommendations for courses of action would be summarized in a national synthesis report to be 
                                                             
43 In the EU case, decision-makers would include the Commission, Parliament and Council. On the Oregon case, see 
John Gastil, Robert Richards and Katherine Knobloch, “Vicarious Deliberation: How the Oregon Citizens’ Review 
Initiative Review Influence Deliberation in Mass Elections”, International Journal of Communication 8:1 (2014): 62-
89. 
44 Suiter et al., “The Irish Constitutional Convention”.  
45 Raphaël Kies, Monique Leyenaar and Kees Niemöller, “European Citizens Consultation: A Large Consultation on 
a Vague Topic” in Raphael Kies and Patrizia Nanz (eds.), Is Europe Listening to Us? Successes and Failures of EU 
Citizen Consultations (London: Routledge, 2013): 59–78. 
46 The funding question is treated by Crosby in this volume. 
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made public and submitted to the Commission or legislature with the request to take an official, 
justified position.  
Important efforts should be made throughout the process to make the consultation accessible and 
visible. This might include promoting public events and deepening collaboration with national 
institutions, civil society organizations, schools, and national public media and social media. 
Following the example of the Oregon Citizens’ Review Initiative, mini-public participants could 
be invited on traditional media to debate the topic and inform the public about this innovative 
consultation method. This would likely have a positive impact on a population which increasingly 
identifies with opinions expressed by other “ordinary” citizens over and against “professional 
politicians” or “bureaucrats”. 
If such consultations can be implemented at the European level - that is characterized by the usage 
of different languages, high levels of complexity and strong resilience to reform - it should be that 
much easier to implement them at the national levels both from a legal and practical perspective. 
Indeed, a similar initiative has already been experimented in the New South Wales Parliament in 
Australia.47 In the last concluding section we will argue that a broad, decentralized 
institutionalization of mini-publics is a necessary (but not sufficient) condition to lay the social 
and psychological foundations for implementing a sortition chamber.  
 
4. Towards a sortition chamber 
In this section, we contend that the institutionalization of consultative mini-publics is the logical, 
necessary next step before we can seriously consider introducing a sortition chamber. As an 
intermediary step to a sortition chamber, institutionalized consultative mini-publics’ usefulness 
                                                             
47 Carolyn Hendriks, “Coupling Citizens and Elites in Deliberative Systems: The Role of Institutional Design”, 
European Journal of Political Research 55:1 (2016): 43–60.  
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can be perceived at four levels at least: a.) testing potential behavioral changes in randomly 
selected participants within a future sortition chamber; b.) gaining citizens’ trust and support; c.) 
gaining decision-makers’ trust and support; d.) reinforcing citizens’ links to a future sortition 
chamber and ability to hold the chamber to account indirectly. 
 
 
a. Behavioral changes 
With regards to randomly selected participants, introducing a sortition chamber presents, as 
mentioned in the “citizen professionalization” section, two opposed dangers the severity of which 
are difficult to gauge without empirical evidence. On one hand, a sortition chamber risks becoming 
a chamber of professionalized citizens, therefore losing its genuine link with the public. On the 
other hand, a longer stay in power, combined with a lack of political experience, could increase 
the risk of interest group influence and partisan contagion. In both cases, sortition chamber 
members would be assimilated to “other politicians”, with no net-increase in democratic 
legitimacy and trust. This threat must be seriously weighed before introducing a sortition chamber.  
Institutionalizing consultative mini-publics would allow us to test, in real conditions, to what 
extent time spent in such mini-publics randomly selected lay citizens’ behavior and autonomy. For 
instance, it would be particularly relevant to compare, over a limited timeframe (e.g. one year), a 
continuous mini-public (i.e. selected citizens participating in all consultations) with one-shot mini-
publics (i.e. newly selected citizens for each consultation). This experimental approach would offer 
important lessons not just on whether lay citizens’ behavior and autonomy are affected by long-
term participation in these mini-publics, but also on how a sortition chamber should be designed 
to avoid these dangers.    
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b. Citizens’ support 
As far as citizens are concerned, institutionalized consultative mini-publics should increase their 
awareness of sortition’s functioning and benefits for selecting participants. Supposing that such 
mini-publics were implemented regularly and successfully, the sortition process would 
increasingly be perceived as a valid method: 1.) to increase the political process’ transparency and 
accessibility; 2.) to represent efficiently citizens’ social and political views; 3.) to decrease political 
and economic organized interests’ influence.  
If these benefits prove successful in practice, chances are good that citizens’ ignorance of and 
resistance to sortition would progressively decrease. To evaluate the public’s readiness to support 
a sortition chamber, national and international surveys should start including, with standard 
questions related to perception and trust in democracy, items measuring knowledge and perception 
of institutionalized consultative mini-publics and sortition chambers.  
 
c. Decision-makers’ support 
If these mini-publics are efficient and the public calls for increased sortition in political institutions, 
decision-makers would have little choice but to consider a sortition chamber as a necessary, 
inevitable reform. As renewed populism shows, with increasing appeal of authoritarian regimes 
and distrust in “classical representative institutions”, it is no exaggeration to assert that the survival 
of the democratic system conceived at the end of 18th century is at risk.  
The political class, which largely backs the institutional permanence of democratic values and 
practices, would have no option but to reform the existing system by including sortition-based 
political practices as one part of broader reforms: first, through institutionalized consultative mini-
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publics and, then, a sortition chamber. From a self-interest perspective, their participation in the 
design of this reform would allow them to retain strong influence in the process and to ensure, at 
a very minimum, their survival. 
 
d. Citizens’ links and holding to account 
Finally, from an institutional perspective, we maintain that institutionalized consultative mini-
publics would inherently strengthen the “raison d’être” behind a sortition chamber by building lay 
citizens’ feedback into the agenda and main legislative initiatives. Moreover, the presence of such 
mini-publics could also heighten the sortition chamber’s interbody accountability. If one and the 
same mini-public were maintained from a legislative proposal’s beginnings until its 
implementation, it could act as an agent verifying whether the decision agreed upon is correctly 
executed and whether sortition chamber members deliberate free of influence or threats, political 
or economic. This would arguably be the most efficient protective procedure as both owe their 
existence and legitimacy to sortition.  
 
e. Conclusion 
In sum, supposing that institutionalized consultative mini-publics were successfully implemented, 
it would contribute not only to laying the grounds for a sortition chamber, but also to reinforcing 
its mission of gathering lay citizens’ opinions and the important task of maintaining indirect 
accountability to citizens. From an inter-institutional perspective, a sortition chamber might 
become the privileged link with lay citizens, i.e. those who are not involved in interest or partisan 
groups, whereas the elected chamber would continue representing organized interests and broader 
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ideologies through political parties. Thus, interest groups would find two distinct entry points for 
their demands.  
From the process could emerge a new institutional equilibrium wherein citizens feel better 
represented (through institutionalized consultative mini-publics and a sortition chamber) and 
organized groups continue playing an important role in gathering different interests (through the 
elected chamber). Though a striking solution in theory, we now have to see through a gradual and 
prudential approach whether it hold up in practice. Only time will tell, for deliberative democracy 
as for all else. 
 
 
 
